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1. With liberalization opening markets, the world is fast growing towards one global 
village. The downside of this trend is that cross-border practices have also been 
developed and unregulated sectors are causing damages, especially to the less 
developed victims that have yet to establish stronger domestic, economic and legal 
regimes
1
. Trade liberalization has occurred through the effect of organisations like 
the WTO reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers of governmental measures seeking to 
reach a global economy. In contrast, the law regulating the behaviour of business 
practices has never been brought into an international framework. 
 
But what occurs on the level of competition law when there is a cross-border case 
involving several jurisdictions? Often the standards and values of the different 
jurisdictions clash or the competition authorities of developing countries are not 
always fully equipped to deal with transboundary practices
2
. As a result, this global 
trend with markets transcending national borders raises the question whether or not 
there is a need for a supranational or multilateral competition framework. Many 
international organisations have started adapting some international competition 
principles but consensus indicates that globalization has created a need for some 
form of international competition law cooperation/ enforcement. 
 
2. Since 1940 efforts have been made to incorporate competition law in the WTO 
framework. However, until today this process is still incomplete. To a large extent, 
the WTO has been seen by many jurisdictions and authors to be the appropriate 
forum
3
, growing from the trust in the GATT/WTO as having a history of being 
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pragmatic and concrete. Even more, the dispute settlement system is perceived to be 




This research paper will investigate whether or not this is a right premise and what 
essentially impeded the WTO from incorporating a competition policy.  
 
The first chapter elucidates the role of competition law as well as the role of the 
WTO. Following this, a historic overview is given of implementing attempts starting 
from the Havana Charter till the Doha negotiations round in 2004. Specific attention 
will be given to the different viewpoints of the major negotiations parties before 
approaching the final Doha Round of Negotiations. 
 
The second chapter identifies the interface between trade law and competition law. 
International trade law has always been seen as resolving the public restraints while 
competition law was primarily concerned with private restraints, but do they 
ultimately encompass the same goals? 
 
The third chapter utterly concentrates its focus on the impediments preventing a 
global WTO competition consensus from being reached. It becomes clear that not 
mere institutional impediments underlie the failure. In particular and with regards to 
the developing countries, the search for an international standard does not reflect 
their interests. 
 
The fourth and final chapter provides four different models reaching a resolution to 
convergence competition law on a multilateral level ranging from the WTO to the 
ICN. The different models are constructed in such a way, with regard to the detected 
impediments, that every model explores its shortcomings and gradually improves in 
the following model. In the fourth and last model, all the elements come together 
which makes this the most viable and realisable of all the models. 
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II. THE HISTORY BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND THE WTO    
 
A. The role of the WTO 
 
3. The World Trade Organization (hereafter the ‘WTO’), which can be seen as the 
modest enhancement of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), came 
into being in 1995
5
. The Uruguay negotiations started in the month of September 
1986 and the results of this negotiation were formally signed at Marrakesh, Morocco 
on 15 April 1994 ensuing in their ratification by various nations and eventually 




The WTO is an international organisation which governs the trade relations of the 
members by reducing and eliminating governmental trade barriers, such as tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions
7
. The procedures of the WTO dispute settlement have been 
used almost exclusively for reviewing governmental trade restrictions and 
distortions
8
. The ultimate goal of this institution is opening up the markets by 
improving the market access of the Member countries.  
 
The whole idea of the WTO is based on the fundamental principles of most-
favoured-nation treatment (MFN), national treatment and transparency. These 
principles are embedded as fundamental, as they establish and maintain non-
discrimination and openness in the international market. They are established to 
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B. The role of competition law 
 
4. Competition law is the law regulating business practices and transactions that 
create or abuse market power and interfere with the free market
10
. The aim of this 
law is to establish and maintain the freedom of enterprises, the equality of 
competitive conditions under which they compete and the openness of markets
11
. 
Hence competition law aims primarily at protecting the processes underlying 




Competition law covers ‘unfair competition practices’ from a domestic market point 
of view but also from an international trade perspective. However the objectives of 
the policy vary from country to country. To put it simply, competition law is there to 
ensure that markets are accessible and consequently that incumbent firms are not 
able to sustain anti-competitive behaviour for any amount of time
13
.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
5. Hoekman and Holmes make the distinction between a competition law and a 
competition policy in which the latter covers a much broader domain than the 
former
14
. Competition law is part of the domain of competition policy which also 
includes components such as privatising state owned firms and reducing the extent of 
policies that discriminate against foreign products. The major difference between 
them is that competition law encounters private restraints whereas competition policy 




6. In a comparison with the WTO, competition law generally protects the areas of 
vertical and horizontal restraints, unilateral restraints like the abuse of dominance 
and merger control, while WTO rather covers the area that aims to protect import-
                                                 
10
 EM Fox ‘Competition Law’ in JH Jackson (Ed.) International Economic Law series Oxford 
University Press Oxford (2008) 417 at 418. 
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competing producers rather than competition and consumer welfare
16
.  So the 
provisions of the GATT and the WTO are generally not used to protect consumer 




C. From the Havana Charter to the Singapore Ministerial Conference 
 
7. Prior to the creation of the WTO there were two serious attempts to create a 
comprehensive framework for international economic relations, one at the Geneva 
International Economic Conference in 1927 and another one following the Second 
World War. In both of them, competition law was often portrayed as an important 




A real competition policy was mentioned the first time in the GATT’s Havana 
Charter of 1947.  The charter for the creation of an International Trade Organization 
included a Restrictive Business Practices chapter whose objective was to prevent 
business practices that restrain competition and adversely affect international trade
19
. 
Chapter V of the Havana Charter was devoted to competition law and policy. Since 
that time, the idea of international competition policy has been debated in many 




8. In the mid 1990’s, the first real substantive talks about implementing competition 
law in the WTO began under the aegis of the European Union. It was Sir Leon 
Brittain, European Commissioner in charge of External Relationship for the 
European Union, who gave the call for a measure in 1992 at the Davos World 
Economic Forum. At this time, the European commission also accordingly appointed 
a group of experts. They argued that competition law belonged in this institution 
because private distortions of competition were a significant problem. However the 
United States and the vast majority of the developing countries declined to support 
this idea
21
. Subsequently, they concluded in their report that an initiative should be 
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taken to start some cooperation between the national competition agencies, 
ultimately resulting in a stage where states should agree to adopt common minimum 





9. In 1996, the Singapore Ministerial Conference established the Working Group on 
the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy
23
. This Working Group 
worked extensively on the areas that merit further consideration in the WTO 
framework
24
. In 1999, 2000 and 2001 they produced three reports
25
 dealing with the 
interaction between trade law and a competition policy towards the perspective of 
introducing competition law into the WTO. Matsushita construes from the reports 
that amongst the members of the WTO an agreement was reached that the WTO and 
competition policy share common objectives, i.e. the promotion of the free market, 
consumer welfare and efficiency
26
. During the Ministerial Conference in Doha, the 
members defined in Paragraph 25 the future task for the Working Group and placed 




However, with regard to the reports that conclusively agreed to work towards the 
implementation of competition policy into the WTO framework, opinions were 
divided. In the following I seek to summarize the respective positions of the 
negotiating parties from the perspective of the respectively the United States, the 




                                                 
22
 Goswami op cit note 6 at 16; AK Koul Guide to the WTO and GATT: Economics, Law and Politics 
(2005) Kluwer Law International The Hague at 533-534. 
23
 Lee op cit note 3 at 121. 
24
 Ibid at 121. 
25
 WTO working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy  Report to the 
General Council, WT/WCTCP/1 (Nov. 28, 1997); WT/WGTCP/2 (Dec. 8, 1998); WT/WGTCP/3 
(Oct. 11, 1999); WT/ WGTCP/4 (Nov. 30, 2000); WT/WGTCP/5 (Oct. 8, 2001). 
26
 Matsushita op cit note 7 at 374. 
27
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Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm. The issues concerning the 













D. Standpoints of the WTO Members 
 




10. The US rejected the Havana Charter in 1948 since they had the fear that 
restrictive business practices would have been used against their own commercial 
interests
29
. Nonetheless the support for competition law in international disciplines 
was originally stimulated by the US deriving from their concerns that international 
cartels and the non-enforcement of national competition law would impede them 
from entering foreign markets
30
. However they do not support the idea of allowing 
their competition rules to be subordinated to an international regime of any kind
31
. 
They appear to prefer the concept of acting unilaterally or pursuing bilateral 
cooperation
32
. Subsequently follows the brief history of the attempts and arguments. 
 
11. Following the Havana Charter, the US defended their stance of being firmly 
against an implementation into the WTO framework. The argument given was often 
centred around the less pro-competitive result a multilateral agreement could turn 
out, as opposed to what the proponents were hoping for
33
. The achievement of a de 
facto international competition law in the field of cartel behaviour would be from 
their perspective thoroughly sufficient on an international level
34
. The US preferred 
the OECD as multilateral forum because their members are ‘like’ nations and the 
                                                 
28
 Hereafter ‘US’. 
29
 G Hufbauer & J Kim ‘International competition policy and the WTO’ (2009) 54 Antitrust Bull. 327 
at 330. 
30
 Hoekman & Holmes op cit note 14 at 877. 
31
 Gerber op cit note 18 at 710; see e.g. AD Melamed Principal Deputy Assistant attorney Gen., 
Antitrust Div., U.S. Deputy of Justice ‘Antitrust enforcement in a Global Economy’ at the Fordham 
corporate Law Institute 25
th
 annual conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 22, 
1998) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2043.pdf. 
32
 AT Guzman ‘International antitrust and the WTO: The lesson from intellectual property’ (2002-
2003) 43 Va.J. Int’l L. 933 at 935; see also EM Fox ‘Global Markets, National Law, and the 
regulation of business: A view from the Top’ (2001) 75 St. John’s L. Rev. 383 at 383; EM Fox 
‘Competition Law and the Millenium Round’ (1999) 2 J. Int’l Econ. L. 665 at 665; Tarullo op cit X at 
478.  
33
 See JI Klein ‘Anticipating the Millennium: International Antitrust enforcement at the end of the 
twentieth century’ in B. Hawk (Ed.) Annual proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: 
international antitrust Law and practice (1998-1999) Juris Publishing Inc New York 1 at 9-10, 
Presented at Fordham corporate law institute 24
th
 annual conference on international law and policy 
(1997), also available at http://www.jurispub.com/cart.php?m=product_detail&p=10083 
34
 H First ‘The Vitamins Case: Cartel prosecutions and the Coming of international competition law’ 
(2001) 68 antitrust L.J. 711 at 727; EM Fox ‘Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual 

















The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) was organised 
in 1997 by the US to research the possibility of an international competition policy 
from the United States perspective
36
. They submitted its report in 1999 with a rather 




The report brought forward that the US was mainly concerned about the swift 
inclusion of competition law into the WTO
38
. The opposing approach could be 
brought together in three problem zones. First was the possible distortion of 
competition standards through the quid pro quo nature of the WTO negotiations, 
together with the fear of having a good already existent enforcement system 
diminishing into an unwieldy and theoretical WTO exercise
39
. Second was the 
existing apprehension towards the intrusion of the WTO’s dispute settlement into 
domestic competition regulatory practices
40
. Last was the inappropriateness of 
obliging countries to adopt these common principles of competition law which are 
domestically often used as policy tools. 
 
12. To conclude, the report proposes that there should be an initiative towards greater 
convergence by means of soft law, but with no necessity to bring this into the 
framework of an international organisation. The committee expressed the view that 
in the end, national authorities are still the best positioned to deal with anti-
competitive practices of private firms that are occurring on their territory
41
. For this 
reason and based on the report of the committee, the American government initiated 
the “International Competitive Network”. Agencies and competition authorities from 
                                                 
35
 Fox ‘Competition Law’ (2008) op cit note 10 at 461. 
36
 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust [electronic resource] final report; Washington, D.C. : U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, 2000.; available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS17186 
37
 Fox ‘Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network’ (2009) op cit note 34 at 158; In 
specific Klein expressed a strong opposition: Klein (1998-1999) op cit note 33. 
38
 Matsushita op cit note 7 at 378. 
39
 Klein (1998-1999) op cit note 33. 
40
 B. Sweeney ‘International competition law and policy: A work in progress’ (2009) 10 Melb. J. 
Int’L. 58 at 60. 
41
 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust Committee Report in the Executive Summary, final report, Washington 












all over the world informally meet here and share their thoughts on the convergence 
of competition law.  
However, due to the perceived developing anticompetitive practices of some BRIC 
countries, the US has expressed more willingness in the 21
st
 century to cooperate 
with EU on an international competition agreement
42
. Nonetheless, they still differ in 
the various approaches with each espousing their own standards and concepts. 
 
2. The European Union position  
 
13. At the Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, the European Union proposed to launch 
an initiative on trade and competition
43
. This is how the Working Group was 
initiated. The US opposed it at first but eventually agreed with the Working Group as 
long as its goal was to share and enhance mutual knowledge without implying the 




The realisation of the single market in the European Union was an encouragement to 
go one step further and export their competition law while inspiring other countries 




In 2000, the EU presented its position paper clarifying its position on the relationship 
between international trade and competition policy
46
. Within this paper, the EU 
argued for a binding WTO framework agreement on competition policy by especially 
advocating for international co-operation. Basically what the EU was proposing is 
                                                 
42
 Lloyd op cit note 2 at 1135. 
43
 Fox ‘Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network’ (2009) op cit note 34 at 154-155. 
44
 See for EU proposal which became the basis for the Singapore antitrust initiative: Commission of 
the European Communities, Report of the Group of Experts, Competition Policy in the new Trade 
Order: Strengthening Internation al Cooperation and Rules, COM (1995) 359 final (Dec. 7, 1995; 
also see European Commission, XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, at 95, COM (1997) 628 final 
(1996). 
45
 Hufbauer & Kim op cit note 29 at 330; A Bradford ‘When the WTO works, and How it fails’ 
(2010-2011) 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 at 23; A Bradford ‘International Antitrust negotiations and the False 
hope of the WTO’ (2007) 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 383 at 408. 
46
 Advocate of an international competition agreement : M Monti ‘European commentator for 
Competition Policy, A global Competition policy?’ Address at the European Competition Day 
Conference (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-
399_en.htm; WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy 
Communication from the European Community and its Members WT/WGTCP/W/152 (Sept. 25, 












international co-operation between the national competition authorities
47
 together 
with agreement on some core principles of competition law and policy
48
. They also 
put forward the option of establishing a Competition Policy Committee within the 




So in contrast to the US, the European Union was prepared to link competition law 
together with trade law
50
. Together with the EU, Japan, Korea and Canada favoured 




3. The developing countries’ position 
 
14. At the time of the Havana Charter, developing countries were demanding an 
implementation of a competition policy into an international framework, especially 
since they saw themselves as victims of predatory behaviour by the EU and the US in 
the 40’s.  
 
In contrast to these decades, 60 years later the developing countries were generally 





Several reasons can be given for this alteration
53
.  
Firstly, the integration would be too intrusive to the national policies of some 
developing countries. In addition, the fear existed in the developing countries that a 




                                                 
47
 Including case specific co-operation to the exchange of general information and principles including 
the aid for development of competition authorities in developing countries through a more coherent 
and enhanced approach for capacity building.  
48
 WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Communication 
from the European Community and its Members WT/WGTCP/W/152 (Sept. 25, 2000). 
49
 Ibid.  
50
 Bradford ‘International Antitrust negotiations and the False hope of the WTO’ (2007) op cit note 45 
at 407. 
51
 Fox ‘Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network’ (2009) op cit note 34 at 156. 
52
 Gerber op cit note 18 at 709-710. 
53
 For more information: Reference to Impediment 1: Margin number 26-34. 
54
 B Sweeney ‘Global competition: Searching for a rational basis for global competition rules’ (2008) 












In particular, the existing threat to them is that the potential competition model law, 
imposed by the US or the EU, will interfere with their industrial, development and 
economic policies and thus may be detrimental to their national goals
55
. Besides 
consumer welfare and economic efficiency, developing countries also take other 
factors into consideration, i.e. public interest as for example employment rate. In 
other words, they acquire themselves some ‘policy space’ to nurture monopolistic 
practices in some branches
56
. Out of economic considerations, they support infant 
industry policies for selected products and business services which eventually imply 
restraints on competition
57
. The integration of a common competition policy would 
therefore imply that compulsory provisions need to be executed by the developing 
countries without having any policy space.  
 
Secondly, most of the competition authorities in developing countries at the time of 
the ongoing negotiations did not yet have a domestic competition law at their 
disposal. Even in the situation where they had incorporated a competition law in their 
domestic legislation already, their competition authorities were often not well 
equipped. They argued having too little experience with competition law while 
eventually setting up a whole competition network according to the WTO standards 




E. The Doha Round of Negotiations 
 
15. In 2001, at the WTO ministerial meeting in Doha, recognition was given to the 
case for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of competition policy 




The core of the proposal
60
 was built upon three critical areas for harmonization
61
. 
Firstly it grew out of the core principles comprising transparency, non-
                                                 
55
 Sweeney ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: some aspects of the interface between trade 
and competition’ (2004) op cit note 14 at 385; Matsushita op cit note 7 at 374. 
56
 Hufbauer & Kim op cit note 29 at 331. 
57
 Ibid at 331. 
58
 KT Do ‘Competition Law and Policy and economic development in developing countries’ (2011) 8 
Manchester J. Int’l Econ. L. 18 at 18.  
59
 Metha & Nayak op cit note 1 at 156. 
60













discrimination, procedural fairness and prohibition of hardcore cartels
62
. Secondly 
the implementation sought to encourage the voluntary cooperation of competition 
authorities. The third and last area was the support for institutional development 




16. The Doha Round of Negotiations was launched in November 2001. The agenda 
of the Doha declaration was quite ambitious as it addressed new issues such as 
investment and competition policy. Nonetheless, when in September 2003 in Cancun 
the Ministerial Conference ended in a deadlock
64
, the General Council of the WTO 
dropped competition policy from the Doha Agenda in 2004 in order to put the 









Reasons given for the lack of consensus were centrally themed in the lack of 
confidence in the norms and procedures of the WTO
67
. In particular and as 
mentioned before, the developing countries expressed a lack of confidence that the 
implementation of competition law would be reflected in a way that would be 
interest based in their perspective
68
. With regard to the abolition of hardcore cartels, 
for example, the developing countries argued that they would not be able to 
                                                                                                                                          
61
 Lee op cit note 3 at 122. 
62
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63
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64
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65
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overcome the regulatory burdens and compliance costs if agreement on these issues 
were to be implemented
69
. This round of negotiations was predominantly focussed 
on displaying a greater recognition of the concerns of the developing countries in 
order to give the WTO its credibility back
70
. Since the developed countries refused to 
unpack and separate the Singapore Issues
71
, it left the developing countries with no 
other possibilities than refusing the whole packet ultimately leaving the competition 
issue unsolved
72
. Because the US and the EU were at odds, the developing countries 
were able to stand up to the pressure.  
 
As a result, the developing countries blocked the initiatives for further negotiations 
and the controversial topic got dropped from the Doha agenda. It is significant that 
few consumer groups and industries lobbied to endorse the international competition 
agreement
73
. Moreover, only a small group of prominent competition authorities 
have prompted the demand for an international competition agreement within the 
WTO. The uncertain result whether or not an international antitrust agreement would 
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III. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW AND COMPETITION LAW  
 
A. The overlapping scope 
1. General 
 
17. Since the stalemate of the Doha Round Negotiations, every initiative to bring 
competition law into this international framework has stalled. National sovereignty 
seems to have won. However, in my opinion and that of the vast majority of authors, 
there is a very clear correlation between competition law and international trade
74
. 
The reasoning starts from the point where private restraints (competition area) 





The Uruguay round succeeded in lessening the barriers to world trade but fuelled the 
demand for opening the markets. As a result it became even more necessary to 
substantially lessen any competition-preventing system/actions. Since the 
accomplished successes over the last fifty years regarding the dramatic fall in 
international tariffs, the focus shifted now to the elimination of non-tariff barriers 
with competition law represented as one of them
76
. A reform in the WTO framework 
would therefore include the adoption of a competition policy in order to check abuse 




2. The complementary role of competition law in international trade law 
 
18. The coverage of competition policy not only extends to the purely domestic 
market, but also influences the international market. The objectives of competition 
policy vary from country to country. Nonetheless competition policy aims in general 
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at controlling not only the activities of private enterprise but also governmental 
restrictions. In this latter respect, competition policy shares a striking similarity in 
goals with the GATT/WTO
78
. The objective of competition policy (key concepts) is 
to establish and maintain the freedom of enterprises, the equality of competitive 
conditions under which they compete, and the openness of markets especially as they 
both promote efficiency and the maximization of consumer welfare
79
. A domestic 
competition policy is therefore closely related to the move towards trade 
liberalization, deregulation and globalization
80
. With reference to the previously 
explained concept of competition policy, in the situation when strategic competition 
polices are actively used by governments, they will eventually distort competition on 
the international market and thus produce negative externalities, thus reducing world 
welfare
81
. For that reason this is the rationale to bring competition law within the 
WTO. 
 
3. Case Law - Examples 
 
19. I present, for a good understanding of the relation between competition law 
(private restraints) and international trade law (public restraints), the following 
examples. 
 
20. Fox mentions the case where private restraints may block outsiders from access 
to markets, for instance when a cartel of domestic producers is tying up essential 
distributors and requires them to reject foreign goods. While states have WTO 
obligations not to block their markets by state restraints, they have no meaningful 
obligation to keep their markets free of private restraints.  
 
States have the WTO obligations not to block their markets by governmental 
restraints. However this does not imply the duty to keep their market free of private 
restraints. By implementing a competition policy, member states could then fulfil 
their WTO obligations through erasing the private restraints by adopting and 
                                                 
78
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enforcing a national competition law/ WTO competition agreement
82
. However Fox 
seeks not for a direct international competition model law/ policy but rather the 
convergence through the law of the country with the exclusionary restraint
83
. 
Nonetheless, the applicable law needs to be a credible law prohibiting unreasonable 
market blocking restraints
84
.   
 
21. Matsushita’s logical reasoning is the following. In the situation that governments 
are controlling restraints of international trade as for example the cartels, private 
restraints will be of less importance as the trade is restricted by the public authorities 
anyway. However, when trade liberalization has been achieved, the next step in a 
trading system requires dealing with private restraints. For this reason, it is important 





The following case correspondingly shows the shortcomings of the WTO regarding 







22. A remarkable case, Photographic Film (Kodak/Fuji
87
), decided by the Dispute 
Settlement Body in 1998, revealed the difference between public restraints addressed 
by the WTO and the private trade restraints which the WTO was ineffective in 
dealing with.  
 
The US government filed a claim, brought within the so called ‘non violation’ 
complaint under Article XXIII of the GATT
88
, with the WTO regarding measures 
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In essence, the US government objected that some restrictive features of the Japanese 
distribution system, which allegedly had been initiated under the directives of their 
government
90
, blocked foreign produced films from entering the Japanese film 
market
91
. The case involved a distribution system created by the market leader, Fuji 
Films, in which four distributors of Fuji acted as exclusive distributors of Fuji 
products. As a result and according to the US, Kodak films were excluded from the 
film wholesaling networks and this prohibited them from accessing the country by 




More important in the perspective of the dissertation is that the WTO ruled that the 
US failed to provide evidence of the participation of the Japanese government 
whereas clearly there was an impediment of international trade
93
. According to 
Matsushita, the central matters of contention in this case were the private trade 
restraints set up by Fuji Films. Therefore she concludes that unless there is some 
change, the WTO will remain largely ineffective concerning issues of private 
conduct (restraint) in international trade
94
. Consequently the WTO will not be 
complete without the inclusion of competition policy within its framework
95
. 
Hoekman and Holmes are of the same opinion that, although competition claims can 
be brought under the ‘non violation’ process, it is a very limited instrument. It brings 
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B. Differing in scope 
 
23. However, while some authors
97
 argue that for instance some features of the anti-
dumping legislation can be mitigated by the incorporation of some competition law 
features, other authors argue that they in essence serve a different goal and are based 




Weiss mentions that international trade law and competition law do not necessarily 
form a stable relationship. According to this author, competition law is focussing on 
the goal of efficiency and consumer welfare while trade law is rather concerned with 
the interest of a country’s individual producers
99
. Nevertheless, he is also of the 
opinion that they share broadly the same goals and are partially overlapping. In 
particular they overlap as both of them affect access to the market by seeking greater 
efficiency in the production and allocation of goods and services through the removal 
of barriers to the competitive process. Essentially, he explains that once trade 
liberalization removes the governmental trade barriers to open market access, 
competition policy comes in to secure open access by removing the private restraints.  
 
According to Hoekman and Holmes, the WTO’s objectives are to pursue a greater 
market access which will eventually result in national welfare while competition law 
basically emphasises welfare and competitive process
100
. Hence as the main focus is 
on market access, national welfare is a side effect without the presumption that this 
always will be the result. Therefore the authors conclude that doubts can be 
expressed regarding the WTO as an appropriate forum to play a constructive role in 
the convergence of competition law
101
. In addition, not all trade related issues are 
competition issues and vice versa
102
. 
                                                 
97
 A Wolff ‘The (notionally) bridgeable chasm between Antirust and Trade policy’ (2003) 47 New 
York Law School Law Review 167 at 167. 
98
 Matsushita op cit note 7 at 374; Hoekman & Holmes op cit note 14 at 887. 
99
 Weiss op cit note 8 at 254. 
100
 Sweeney is of the same opinion and shares the following example. In an already competitive 
market, a competition policy will rather be neutral on the coming of new entrants. Whilst trade law is 
concerned with the competitor’s rights and thus the right of the new entrant to enter the market. It is 
therefore not focused on an objective standard such as consumer welfare. Sweeney ‘Globalisation of 
competition law and policy: some aspects of the interface between trade and competition’ (2004) op 
cit note 14 at 414. 
101
 Hoekman & Holmes op cit note 14 at 887. 
102
 Sweeney ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: some aspects of the interface between trade 













24. To conclude, in my opinion and that of the vast majority of the legal authors, 
both the WTO and the competition policy aim to promote and maintain a free and 
open trading system. Their similarities are unmistakable. 
 
 
IV. DEFINING THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS 
 
 
25. Given that some competition law provisions are already incorporated in the WTO 
agreements
103
, then what are still the institutional, political and legal elements that 
still hinder the addressing of major trans-border violations of competition law that 
hamper international trade and impact global welfare
104
? Although for instance 
Weiss who is of the opinion that the focus on “interaction problems” between trade 
law and competition law needs to be clarified rather than focussing on harmonizing 




Therefore the following chapter will give an overview of the factors impeding 
implementation of global competition policy within the WTO. Furthermore and 
where possible, attention will be given to how much current circumstances differ 
from the time of the DOHA round of negotiations, which raises the question if WTO 
is ready to take the next step. 
 
A. Developing countries and international competition law?  
 
26. Developing countries came to recognize the substantial difference a competition 
law can make towards reaching their goals. Therefore they started adopting and 
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integrating new competition laws
106
. Lately, seventy of the world’s developing 




The main question remaining is if the developing countries should follow the 
developed countries in their competition policies and emulate them, or if they should 
rather adopt their own legislation according to their developmental status.  
 
When looking for the emerging international consensus on competition standards, it 
is apparent that while these standards are good for, for example, America, this does 
not imply that they are necessarily good for (Sub-Saharan) Africa. Optimal standards 
for developed countries may differ from those of developing countries
108
. When 
looking for international standards to convergence competition law, they tend to be 
the standards of the United States or the European Union. Probably the major 
impediment is the difference between the economic policies of developed and 
developing countries.  
 
By the following arguments, divided in three appropriate questions that should be 
taken into consideration, I will demonstrate that developing countries cannot aspire 





1. The objectives of their competition law 
 
Firstly, what is the aim of the competition law they are envisaging?  
 
27. As mentioned before, competition policies differ from country to country. The 
US’s competition policy is concerned with the promotion of allocative efficiency and 
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consumer welfare while the EU prefers to make the trade-off between the loss of 
competition and the gains of efficiency. For developing countries it is important to 
have a competition policy which is designed to take appropriate account of their level 
of development and the long term objective of sustained growth
110
. Therefore they 
should adopt a competition policy encouraging the long term growth of productivity. 
So Singh is of the opinion that they, instead of having a static policy, should adopt a 
dynamic competition policy in order to attract foreign investors
111
. Laffont argues 
even more strongly that competition law is a good thing in the ideal world with a 
large number of participants, no public goods, no externalities, complete markets, 
and no natural monopolies. However, according to the author, because developing 
countries are so far from the ideal world, it is not always the case that competition 
should be encouraged in these countries
112
. Nevertheless, this argument is in my 
opinion outdated as most of the developing countries have recently adopted a 
competition law. 
 
2. Competition law used as a policy tool 
 
Secondly and subsequently, the question that should be asked is to which extent 
developing countries should use their competition law as a policy tool. 
 
28. The following can best be shown by examples of how and why their competition 
policy should be dynamic instead of accepting an international competition 
consensus adopted and enforced by the WTO. 
 
29. The first example is one where they differ from the developed countries in the 
fact that sometimes it is better to act then not to act. 
 
Predatory pricing has repeatedly been declared as a rarely occurring event and 
mostly unsuccessful in the US
113
. The US Supreme Court has formulated a rule of 
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law to make it nearly impossible for a plaintiff to win a predatory pricing case
114
. 
They also abolished the antitrust duty of a dominant firm to supply a scarce input or 





The reasoning behind this rule of reason expresses the fear that duties on dominant 
firms will undermine or lessen the incentives of these dominant firms to invest and 
invent in their business. Never put across, however, is the implication that rival firms 
or smaller firms may have incentives to invent or innovate undermined. Fox 
articulates this as one of the particular differences between the economy of a 
developed and a developing country.   
 
Developing countries were for a long time dominated by an economy which was 
regulated by state-owned markets together with barriers to entering the market
116
. In 
such countries, dominant firm predation and exclusion are out of control and 
especially harmful
117
. They are major forces in keeping markets closed and 
uncompetitive. As a result, the cost of antitrust non-intervention is in many 
circumstances likely to be higher than the costs of intervention
118
.   
 
This example shows clearly hat the search for an international consensus often 
collides with the standards of developed countries and developing countries. For this 
reason, in developing countries, the cost of antitrust non-intervention is in many 
circumstances likely to be higher than the costs of intervention. Hence Noonan 
makes the proposition that one could adopt special competition rules during the 
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transitional period of the developing country and gradually adopt the international 




30. The second example is when developed and developing countries differ in their 
basic idea and values of competition policy.  
 
Developed countries may for instance prohibit a merger between two large domestic 
firms on the reasoning that the gains of efficiency do not outweigh the loss of 
competition. However it may be legitimate in developing countries, for those same 
domestic firms, to be allowed the merger on the terms of being able to compete with 




Competition is no longer a domestic matter but is rather used as a fundamental 
strategy of a government to respond to the globalised markets
121
. In other words, 
competition law can be used in order not to make firms more competitive within 
their own domestic market, but rather to make them viable to compete with 
international/multinational globalised firms
122
. Specifically for developing countries 
within a developmental state, competition law could have enormous socioeconomic 





3. Lack of capacity and resources 
 
Do the developing countries possess the necessary capacities? 
 
31. The competition authorities of developing countries are often not well enough 
equipped and do not have the right knowledge, infrastructure and resources to 
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execute their task. As a result, developing countries are a long way ahead from 
having the institutional capacity to implement some developed competition 
principles
124
.  In particular, they fear not having the right capacities to discipline the 
anti-competitive practices of foreign multinational firms which will eventually have 
detrimental effects
125
. Singh therefore proposes setting out far less difficult and fewer 
rules to implement for the developing countries as they will be easier to be enforced 




Clearly the developing countries need to be supported in the enforcement of their 
legislation and supported to overcome their lack of expertise and experience. The 
latter could be provided by giving them technical experience and capacity building 
through a cooperative network of competition authorities
127
. Such cooperation would 
facilitate the enforcement and foster economic growth. 
 
4. No to international standards, Yes to Cooperation 
 
32. In considering the issue of using a common competition policy, adopted by the 
WTO, emphasis should be placed on a dynamic rather than static efficiency as the 
main objective of a competition policy for developing countries. Developing 
countries should seek for a concept of optimal degree of competition instead of 
encouraging a maximum level of competition. The former implies a level of 
competition where on the one hand there is not too much competition law deterring 
the propensity to invest but on the other hand there is enough competition law 
entailing sufficient rivalry to reduce inefficiency
128
. Sang concludes that there 
certainly should not be a multilateral discipline of the WTO type obliging developing 
countries to have universal competition policies or even more, any competition 
policy at all when it is determined that the costs are higher than the benefits
129
.  Fox 
is also of the opinion that developing countries must develop their own brand of 
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33. However Kim and other authors argue that developing countries are beginning to 
appreciate their vulnerability to anticompetitive practices expressed in the evolution 
of adopting domestic competition laws
131
. To indicate this, a common example used 
is the export cartels designed to exploit their market power on foreign markets which 
tend to be merely developing countries
132
. Consequently developing countries could 
arguably gain from an international agreement abolishing such an uncompetitive 
practice
133
. However, developing countries aspire for the abolition of cartels (when 
they import) but they argue for exceptions when they export.
134
 Here is a non-
competition example: should developing countries favour the abolition of anti-
dumping measures as the developed countries are often using them as a protectionist 
device? The answer is no, since often developing countries are also using this device 
against other developing countries
135
. Even in the case that developed or OECD 
countries decide to agree on the banning of export cartels, a quid pro quo will be 
demanded from the developing countries and especially one that goes further than 




34. Nevertheless, I can conclude that support for a competition law is highly needed 
for developing countries, but the acceptance of a common international competition 
policy is not feasible to support the need of these countries. This is not only due to 
the different developmental circumstances of developed countries but is also 
significantly due to the variation in the interests of different developing countries. 
Suitable solutions could be the adoption of certain competition minimum rules with a 
rule of reason including a public policy defence for developing countries. 
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B. The search for consensus - Sovereignty 
 
The following deals with the concerns for the search for consensus and subsequently 
the sovereignty issue. The arguments can be divided in two sections. 
 
35. The first setback starts on the assumption that countries do agree on the 
relationship between competition policy and trade law. However this does not imply 
that countries have a common sense of competition policy. In particular, countries 
diverge on the merits, potential modalities and even further on the necessity of 




Precisely on the matter of substantive competition law, the similarities are not 
apparent as every jurisdiction reflects its own economic, social, political and 
historical experiences
138
. It is therefore very difficult to converge existing national 
competition regimes into one single standard, especially since these national policies 
not only entail different standards but also require different methods of determination 
with regard to designed actions in a specific market (mergers, tying, …)
139
. National 
competition authorities differ in welfare standards (e.g. consumer welfare vs. total 
welfare), on different goals (e.g. different efficiency concepts, protection of the 
competitive process, freedom of competition) and on the inclusion of ‘non-welfare’ 
goals in particular for developing countries (market integration, economic 




36. The pre-eminent example to illustrate the latter is the remarkable difference 
between the US’s concept of competition and that of the European Union. Whereas 
the US law has been guided by focusing on market performance
141
 the EU stresses 
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the process of competition to achieve various ends
142
. The principle view of the US 
on competition law is to advance the competitive process rather than to protect the 
competitors
143
, while the European view on competition is concerned with the 
following: “It does not regard competition as an end itself but a means to an end”. 
This will eventually lead to a trade-off approach
144
.  
An appropriate example can be given with the assessment of respectively an 
American competition authority and a European competition authority. When the 
merger would be in se prohibited by the American authority, the European authority 
would allow the merger in the case that it can be shown that the welfare reducing 
effect of increased market power resulting from the merger is more than matched by 
gains to society
145
. Hence a case by case approach will be applied instead of the in se 
approach and conversely the merger will be allowed when the uncompetitive effect is 




37. Hoekman and Holmes argue that seeking an agreement on the determination of 
different substantial competition law subjects could be detrimental to some countries. 
A general consensus about substantive issues is according to them non-existent
147
. 
Also the published guidelines make it apparent that opinions differ considerably 
between the United States and the various EU countries in which practices are 
viewed as potentially anti-competitive
148
. According to Maskus and Lahouel, it is 
very difficult if not impossible to find the ‘ideal’ definition or application of 
competition law
149
. So considering the fact that there is no real consensus and when 
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even the supporters of the idea
150
 recognize that there will be long negotiations and 




For given reasons the majority in the doctrine are of the opinion that the convergence 





38. What relates to procedural competition law is often less disputed in the doctrine. 
Proposals are made to adopt rules within the WTO to enhance enforcement 
cooperation between national competition authorities and a choice of law system for 




39. Secondly, another main concern put forward by the WTO member states is the 
requirements for a multilateral agreement. This would require to a certain extent a 
standardisation of the domestic policies and thereby deprive many of important 
policy tools (ref. to competition policy)
154
. As competition law is recognised as one 
of the basic tools in support of particular economic strategies, members are not eager 
to hand over this sovereignty. For this reason the application of soft law, for example 





40. To summarize briefly, a common set of substantive competition rules for all 
WTO members is not feasible as many established competition laws represent unique 
social and legal visions that cannot be readily transferred to other nations
156
. In 
general and specifically with regard to developing countries: one size does not fit all. 
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C. The WTO ‘as such’ 
 
 
41. The third major impeding factor concerns the question whether or not the WTO 
‘as such’ is an appropriate institution to converge competition law. The doctrine is 
divided between advocates and opponents. 
 
On the one side, 
 
42. Many reasons were responsible for the failed attempt to include competition law 
on the negotiation agenda for the DOHA round of negotiations as there were political 
and legal concerns and in particular institutional concerns. Reasons given for the lack 
of support were centrally themed around lack of confidence in the norms and 




Many organizations have been founded by the international competition community 
to examine the possibilities of convergence. Organizations like the International 
Competition Network (ICN), the International Chamber of Commerce’s Commission 
on Law Practices in Relation to Competition were founded together with several 
joint meetings of Bar Associations and annual conferences distributing guidelines on 
the convergence of competition law
158
. This was a response of the community 
towards the limited progress that was made by the plurilateral and multilateral 
agreements
159
. The implication is therefore that it is more practical to reach 




43. One of the impediments frequently raised is the relationship between competition 
law and the objectives of the WTO. These objectives are often seen as serving to 
protect international trade which implicates that competition law must serve this goal 
as well
161
. The real concern of the developing countries relates exactly to this point 
                                                 
157
 Gerber op cit note 18 at 710. 
158
 Noonan op cit note 4 at 56. 
159
 A Schaub ‘The Global competition Forum: How it should be organised and operated’ at European 
Policy Centre Brussels (March 14, 2001) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_003_en.pdf. 
160
 Noonan op cit note 4 at 57. 
161
 ME Janow ‘Observations on TWO Multilateral Venues: the International Competition Network 












as they fear that competition law will be used as a trade tool. For example in relation 
to market access, developing countries are afraid that developed countries will use 
competition law in order to have easier access to their markets while developed 




44. According to Gerber, two obstacles impede the WTO from implementing 
competition law into the organisation. Firstly there is a lack of confidence that the 
norms, practices and procedures of the WTO rest on a robust conception of 
community and secondly there is uncertainty about what the exact role of the WTO 
as an institution would include
163
. 
According to this author, the WTO operates primarily as a venue for negotiating and 
transferring access right to the markets of member countries, but introducing 
competition law into the WTO would require a different or at least additional concept 
of the WTO’s goals and operations
164
. To achieve this ambition, it would be 




On the other side, 
 
45. There are the legal commentators convinced that the WTO is the most feasible 
institution to convergence competition law. 
 
46. One of the most regular arguments brought up is the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the WTO
166
. Unlike the WTO, other institutions like for example 
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UNCTAD and ICN do not have a dispute settlement mechanism at their disposal. 
Noonan argues that this could be the reason that the achievements of UNCTAD, 
despite their global reach, are rather modest with regard to their attempts to 
convergence the international competition law. This author is of the opinion that 
unless there is a binding agreement with a dispute settlement mechanism, states are 




47. Another pro-argument used by the advocates is the possible trade-off zone
168
. 
The argument starts from the assumption that countries negotiating an international 
competition agreement will likely negotiate on sector-specific substantive 
competition law-related problems
169
. While the WTO deals with a broad range of 
trade issues, members may have the possibility to trade-off between different or even 
unrelated values
170
. Thus such a trade-off could possibly increase the zone of 
agreement in multiparty settings
171
. Other legal commentators however are against 
this since it includes the risk that issue linkage could require trade-offs between 
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V. CONVERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
LAW: FOUR DIFFERENT MODELS 
 
 
50. Many legal scholars and authors are of the opinion that a common competition 




Initially while the search for a model law was still a concern, there was not so much 
question about the fact that the US would impose their competition law as model 
law
174
. However there was concern from both sides. Developing countries reasoned 
that the US competition law would disadvantage their countries in development 
circumstances, while American observers argued that the implication of making the 
US competition law as a model law would include that their own competition laws 




Nevertheless, as mentioned in the impediment chapter, unification through the search 
for one certain consensus is not a workable option. Consequently, the proposed 
solutions enhance harmonisation instead of unification as diversity will be 
encompassed
176
. In view of that routes have been explored to include competition 





51. Therefore the question remains in which format the latter should be 
accomplished. Several options can be distinguished in order to reach the necessary 
convergence of competition law. 
The first model will explore the possibility of keeping the WTO in its current form 
dealing with public and private related provisions. Secondly and in my opinion a 
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more plausible and well thought-out solution is the integration of a competition law 
agreement mirrored to the structure of the TRIPS agreement.  
 
However opponents are of the opinion that in the foreseeable future, the likelihood of 
having competition law integrated in the WTO framework is very small
178
. So in 
case harmonization is not possible within the body of the WTO, solutions should be 
sought through soft law. The third proposed model is therefore harmonization 
through soft law focussing on the International Cooperation Network
179
. The final 
model brings all the elements together in the, in my opinion, most feasible solution 
which attempts to bring the complementary ICN and WTO institutions together 
through cooperation. 
 
A. Model I: Competition law provisions in the different existing WTO 
agreements 
 
52. A number of competition provisions are already included in the WTO agreements 
or as a minimum very closely related. In essence, they are often designed to embrace 
free trade but they cover the same competition issues. Examples can be found in the 
GATTS, TRIPS, Anti-Dumping Agreement, Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Agreement on Safeguards and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures.  
 
Weiss is of the opinion that when the GATT transformed into the WTO, a greater 
emphasis was put on broader and integrated market access guarantees. Consequently 
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By examining the following examples, a conceivable solution could be found in 
broadening these provisions by interpreting them broadly or adding specific 
competition law provisions in order to erase private restraints. 
 
1. Explicit Competition Provisions 
 




53. The following provision deals with private market access barriers
182
. This can be 
seen as an application of the MFN principle. The article entails a system similar to 
the ‘abuse of control’ mechanism which is exercised by domestic competition law 
authorities in some countries
183
. It provides that any service supplier, being in a 
monopoly position, has to act in a manner consistent to his commitments made in 
Article II of GATS
184
. Thus every member has to act in accordance with 
unconditional and immediate requirements regarding all services and the service 




Article IX of GATS 1994:   
 
54. This provision acknowledges that certain business practices of WTO members 
probably restrain competition. Consequently it lays the responsibility on WTO 
members to supply non-confidential and practical information concerning the unfair 




Article XVI of GATS 1994: 
 
55. This article provides for market access besides the most favoured nations 
treatment. As per Article XXIV of GATS it provides for the mechanism for a 
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Council for Trade in services that can decide if a monopoly is abusing power and can 
ask the member to whom the monopoly belongs to supply information of such abuse. 
 




56. This article on voluntary export restraints would have no teeth to execute the 
Article without the competition rule provisioned in Article 11.3 of the Agreement. 
Article 11.3 is designed to discourage private exporters from engaging in restrictive 




Article 8(2) & 40 TRIPS agreement:  
 
57. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) recognizes that intellectual property rights and licensing in specific can be 
used in an unreasonable and abusive way, harming trade and competition. Therefore, 
stipulated in Article 8 and 40 of the TRIPS, it counterbalances these granted IP rights 





In particular, article 8(2) of the TRIPS agreement specifies that states are allowed to 
regulate anti-competitive behaviors when consistent with the agreement, that 
“unreasonable restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology”
190
. Such specific restrictive practices can cover unilateral abuse of the IP 
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Article 8(2) can be read in conjunction with article 40 of the TRIPS agreement which 
specifically provides member states to take measures relating to anti-competitive 
licensing practices producing reasonable restraints on trade
192
. A consultative 
procedure is hence to be followed when such practices have transnational effects
193
. 
In effect, these provisions include some competition policy considerations and ensure 




However, arguments are raised that neither Article 8 nor 40 of TRIPS clarifies the 
exact scope of the competition policy enacted in these provisions. As a result they 
leave many questions unanswered relating to endorsing an exact approach to the 
subject of states regulating abuses of intellectual property rights
195
. A lack of 
guidance is noticed. 
 




58. Nearly all the WTO member countries agreed to an additional set of competition 
commitments derived from a reference paper which was attached/in relation to the 
WTO GATS Basic telecommunication Services Agreements (Hereafter Reference 
Paper (RP))
197
. Initially the majority of the telecommunication sector was operated 
under a legal monopoly regime
198
. Since liberalization, this reference paper has come 
into effect to prevent the former monopoly holder from using its acquired rights in a 
way detrimental to new entrants in the market
199
. Therefore the RP provides 
competition requirements to safeguard market access and foreign investment, in 
order to prevent the major suppliers of anticompetitive behaviour
200
. These 
competition rules are thus only designed for this specific market’s behaviour and 
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regulation. These obligations for the monopoly holder are complementary to those 




Section 1.2 of the RP refers to three examples of anti-competitive practices including 
“(i) engaging in cross-subsidization, (ii) use of information obtained from 
competitors with anti-competitive results and (iii) withholding technical and 




The latter makes the Reference Paper the most competition-related trade 




2. Enforcement mechanism: Article XXIII GATT – Non violation Clause 
 
59. In principle, national competition laws and cases are subject to the application of 
the dispute settlement system when they are not in accordance with obligations 
embedded in the WTO agreements
204
. However, in the current circumstances, the 
non-violation complaint embedded in Article XXIII(b) of the GATT is the only 




Article XXIII (b) of the GATT
206
 could potentially be an essential asset for the 
further relation between trade and competition related issues. The article is 
applicable when a state can establish the nullification or impairment of a benefit or 
any objective that has been granted to it under the GATT even if the measure does 




60. The purpose of this article is clear. It is designed to prevent measures that were 
initially and specifically not prohibited but currently are preventing free trade and 
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distorting legitimate expectations of WTO members
208
. The scope, however, has 
never been clear. At this stage, the use of this non violation claim is considered
209
 to 
be an exceptional rare remedy requiring detailed justification
210
. Hence this model 
suggests a broad interpretation of this provision which encompasses all instances 




The application of this article needs three requirements to be established. The 
claimant needs to prove that the (importing) state has engaged in a measure and by 
implication that this measure nullified or impaired the existence of a benefit. The 
third and last requirement obliges the proof of a concession or benefit, directly or 




Habitually subsidy claims are the common applicable area
213
 but nonetheless the 
article is not only restricted to subsidies
214
. Claims could be potentially brought 
before the WTO panel when the exporting state is able to establish the failure or 
refusal of the importing state to employ its competition laws against its local firms
215
. 
In the event that this failure nullifies or impairs the importing state’s agreed tariff 
concessions, the claim could be held to be successful.   
 
61. However, opponents query if the non-violation complaint is still relevant since 
many non-tariff barriers are now inserted in WTO agreements216.  
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In particular for competition law, panels have circumscribed the use of this complaint 
by strengthening its requirements which makes it nearly impossible for competition 
law-related complaints. For instance, as seen in the Kodak/ Fuji case, there must be a 
required level of state involvement to hold the government liable for the private 
action
217
. Moreover, the more indirect an anti-competitive measure becomes, the 
more unlikely it is to establish the task of a government involved action. For example 
when developing countries do not possess a competition law, the mere failure to 
enact such a law is unlikely to be a measure. 
 
This article clearly recognises that that this provision is not designed to deal with the 




62. Therefore, when incorporating more competition law provisions within the 
existing agreements, an amendment of the provision or at least broader interpretation 
will be necessary to extend its scope in order to cover the entire area of competition-
related issues which are not specifically named in the competition provisions
219
. As a 
result, the state’s failure to adopt or enforce its competition law could be included in 
the non-violation clause. As mentioned, disputes concerning rights and obligations 
under the WTO agreements may be settled under WTO’s dispute settlement 
mechanism. Consequently, claims arising out of competition law provisions 
embedded in the WTO agreements are subject to this mechanism. In accordance with 
the broad interpretation of the non-violation clause, both could possibly cover the 
complete area of competition law on a multilateral level.  
Nonetheless, there are many drawbacks related to this provision. For instance, it 
would imply that a competition authority is required to prosecute every single 
competition case, while lacking time and equipment
220
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Thus far there have been few WTO dispute settlement adjudications that address 
market access implications of a competition perspective directly or indirectly
222
. The 
Telmex case is to date one of the few competition cases settled under the dispute 
settlement mechanism and is regarded as the first case where competition law and 
international trade law walk hand in hand.  
 




63. This case is regarded as a successful premiere of the WTO addressing combined 
public and private restraints since the Reference Paper is the first in which explicit 
competition policy considerations are incorporated. 
 
64. The following case dealt with the question whether or not Mexico had violated its 
commitments of anticompetitive practices under Section 1 and the procompetitive 
provisions under Section 2 of the Telecoms Reference Paper
224
. The United States, 
which initiated the complaint, claimed that Mexico had set up a cartel of Telecom 
operators with Telecom in charge that raised the price of terminating cross border 





The WTO panel decid d in favor of the United States by determining that Mexico had 
not done enough to prevent anti-competitive measures in its market from impeding 
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foreign competitors to enter the market226. Furthermore the panel stated that antitrust 
issues are intractably tied to national treatment and market access
227
. More important 
than the outcome is how this case provides insight into how the WTO might handle 
future competition law cases. This significance extends further than the Telecom 
sector since the Reference paper is suggested as template for opening other sectors. 





65. Nevertheless, many authors expressed their concerns regarding the WTO’s 
dispute settlement mechanism taking up the role of global competition authority
229
. 
As its main competition provisions were left undefined in the RP, the WTO panel 
was left with a wide policy space regarding to the interpretation of these competition 
commitments
230
. However, the WTO panel was not afraid to define the latter. For 
instance, from a competition point of view, it laid out detailed definitions of “major 
suppliers” and market definition. Furthermore, it stretched the definition of anti-




With regard to the anti-competitive practices, the Reference paper provides a non-
exhaustive list of “anti-competitive practices”. The panel decided this term is not 
defined distinctly enough, and thus used other sources to examine what 
anticompetitive behavior encompasses. As a result, the panel read a cartel ban into 
the commitments to anticompetitive behavior, whereas none of the signatories have 
agreed to add these commitments to the Reference Paper
232
. Therefore Marsden 
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With regard to the state doctrine, the panel held that Mexico could not order business 
to engage in anticompetitive conduct and thus overruled the state doctrine which was 
the given justification of economic development reasons specified by Mexico. The 
latter defended this strategy on the basis of its defense regulatory sovereignty. They 
argued that, in the interest of their economic development, it was necessary to allow 
or require Mexican firms to charge extraordinary prices to foreign carriers serving 
Mexico
234
. Despite the accuracy of this appeal, it is clear, in my opinion, that the 
current Reference Paper and its extension to other provisions do not entail any 
consideration regarding a rule of reason or public policy mechanism for the 
developing countries through the perspective of their economic development. Model 




66. On the one hand, some authors are of the opinion that the implementation of 
given competition provisions imply that the drafters of the WTO saw the need to 
integrate a variety of competition principles
235
. It is their belief that the WTO is 
capable and ready to incorporate more provisions to tackle private restraints with 
anti-competitive behaviour. The addition of the provisions would be advantageous 
since these issues can often not be solved on a domestic level of competition law. 
 
In particular, Fox argues that the WTO could for instance usefully expand the 
obligations of member states to prohibit trans-border cartels or at least to aid in 
discovery and enforcement against their own nationals when requested to do so by 
states that have been injured by cartels
236
. Such an addition to the WTO obligations 
would be, according to this author, a small but practical step since under the 
safeguards agreement states have the obligation to refrain from ordering or 
encouraging import or export cartels
237
. As a result developing countries would be 
less vulnerable to offshore cartels as they do not have enough resources to protect 
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themselves, in comparison with developed countries that are protected by bilateral 
agreements and extraterritorial enforcement.  
 
It is suggested by Fox that competition issues that are related to market access and 
thus tackle the issue of private restraints should be incorporated into the WTO. 
However some solutions, not related to international trade law, can best be prepared 
on a horizontal level such as the ICN
238
. (See Model IV). Nevertheless even the 
advocates are aware of the dispersed competition provisions throughout the WTO 
agreements which cannot satisfactorily address the relation between international 
trade law and competition law, and so subsequently admit that competition law is 
still a domestically regulated subject
239
. So far, it is only the TRIP’s and the Telecom 





67. On the other hand, there is dispute surrounding this Model as representing the 
WTO in its current form with in addition the incorporation of supplementary 
competition law provisions. Following arguments can be distinguished as opposing 
this model. 
 
68. Firstly, the competition law provisions are scattered around in several WTO 
agreements. For this reason, the majority of authors contend that the current WTO 
agreements do not form a sufficient basis for an international competition policy and 
lack the necessary institutional infrastructure
240
. Sweeney argues that broad 
interpreting, amending or adding provisions to the existing instrumental and 
institutional structure would not be sufficient to fill gaps
241
. In particular, these gaps 
represent the areas where the member states did not indicate their willingness to hand 
over their sovereignty. A separate agreement is thus necessary. Even in the presence 
of certain competition provisions, the relation between the WTO (international trade 
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law) and competition does not provide a coherent basis for a global competition 
policy as there may be competition issues not related to market access and thus out of 
the scope of the WTO
242
. For instance the elaborated competition law provisions 
such as mentioned in the Reference Paper are sector-specific competition provisions 
which are mainly focused on market access for foreign suppliers, while general 
competition law agreement/ provision is concerned with overall general competitive 
conditions in a market
243
. At worse, these sector provisions can have a negative 




As a result, the ultimate goal of convergence or harmonization of competition law 
will not succeed. 
 
69. Secondly there are the concerns related to one of the major impediments 
hindering the introduction of a global competition policy, namely the developing 
countries. This model does not take any dynamic preferential mechanism into 




Therefore such mechanism is something that acquires a separate agreement.  
 
70. The third and last objection raised by the doctrine is the dispute settlement 
mechanism deciding about competition law-related disputes. 
The incorporation of competition law-related provisions retains rights and 
obligations for the Member states. Nevertheless, there are currently no competition 
law-related definitions or established knowledge which enriches the WTO when 
deciding upon competition disputes such as those a domestic competition authority 
has
246
. This was also a subject of dispute in the Telmex case. 
 
Since there is no WTO definition of anti-competitive practices or abuse of 
dominance, the WTO panel based its reasoning on the open-ended language and the 
object and purpose of the Telecoms Reference paper, international practice and 
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. Therefore the panel decided to add horizontal price fixing and 
market sharing agreements to the non-exhaustive list of anticompetitive practices 
listed in Section 1.2 of the Telecoms Reference Paper
248
. Marsden shares the before-
mentioned opinion of Sweeney and highlights the danger of this practice. In essence, 
the dispute settlement mechanism added a cartel ban as a WTO commitment which 




In addition, the WTO dispute settlement body does not possess the techniques, 
mechanisms or equipment that domestic competition authorities use to assess an anti-
competitive practice resulting ultimately in a sub optimal interpretation of the 
competition law provisions
250
. Especially concerning developing countries, it is very 
difficult to reconcile their existing competition law and evaluate the appropriateness 





B. Model II: Competition agreement within the WTO: minimum rules with a 
public defence mechanism 
 
71. Hence, there is a seeming consensus on the need for a new competition 
multilateral agreement, since the WTO in its current form is not fully capable of 
dealing with private restraints and competition law in particular. As became clear out 
of the first proposal, the provisions are scattered around through the different WTO 
agreements, rendering them impractical. The most feasible alternative seems to be a 
convergence of national competition policies through a multilateral framework, 
being the WTO, without implying a static wide set of common substantive 
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72. Therefore the second proposed model is, while tackling the mentioned 
impediments, the implementation of an international agreed competition policy 
existing out of minimum rules. Such a proposition is reflected to the structure of the 
TRIPS agreement. The aim or objective is to provide a minimum degree of content 
implemented in domestic competition law
253
. The existence of the TRIPS agreement 
is a classic example of the tradeoff that occurred between developed and developing 
countries. Hence a lesson could be drawn from the TRIPS agreement since both 
areas (competition and IP) have very similar implications for developing countries
254
. 
For this reason particularly the WTO is the appropriate forum as it presents a 




73. This model comprises merely the elements suggested by the European Union in 
the Working Groups of what components a competition agreement should entail
256
. 
Eventually in the Doha Ministerial Declaration support was expressed for this 
proposal through agreement on further elaboration of these elements in the existing 
Working Group
257
.  The Working Group would thereafter have continued their 
preparations, but stalled them when the topic got dropped from the negotiating 
agenda
258
. However the text of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
259
 indicates 
consensus amongst the members that the following elements should be integrated 





74. Their proposal compromised the core principles of the WTO reflected in the 
domestic competition laws such as non-discrimination, transparency, procedural 
fairness, special and differential treatment/public policy/ exemptions, as well as 
certain commitments to deal with hardcore cartels and serious breaches of 
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. Often the minimum rules would be the maximum rules for 
developing countries. As noted that developing countries should accept a dynamic 
competition agreement rather than a static one, a special and differential treatment 
would, as ruled out in the TRIPS agreement, include a specific public policy 
consideration since the developing countries feared that agreeing to an international 
competition standard would open up their markets for competitive multinationals. 
Thus they wanted, for instance, the assurance that the “market access” commitment 




1. Development of the TRIPS agreement  
 
75. The developed countries requested a high IP protection since they wanted their 
undertakings in research and development protected throughout the whole world 
when exporting their products. Developing countries at the other hand were the 
importers of IP products who preferred a low level of IP protection in order to have 
access to new technologies
263
. Various efforts have been made on an international 
level to conclude an international intellectual property agreement ranging from 
bilateral to regional or other international institution attempts
264
. Once parties 
brought negotiations within the WTO, they reached an agreement due to the desire of 
developing countries to receive concessions in the area of agricultural subsidies or 
market access for their own agricultural goods in exchange for accepting the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement
265
.Ultimately an agreement was 




76. The TRIPS agreement encompasses a minimum level of rules unification, a 
broader range of harmonisation principles
267
 and invites a full consideration of 
policies for competition maintenance in countries where such policies are weakly 
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For this reason and with reference to the impediments concerning the developing 
countries, the issue at stake is similar to the pursuit for an international competition 
agreement.  
 






77. Examination of the TRIPS agreement reveals that it was the decision to bring 
intellectual property rights within the WTO framework which was eventually the key 
to success. In particular, the trade-off that took place between different trade-related 
issues enhanced the negotiation process.  Guzman argued, before the topic was 
dropped from the Doha agenda, that unless negotiations regarding a global antitrust 
regime took place in the WTO or some other mechanism which facilitates transfers 
among states, a substantive agreement would be unlikely
271
. Guzman is for this 
reason an advocate of keeping competition law within the WTO as according to him 




Bradford observes that the existence of the TRIPS agreement is a very important 
precedent in the capability of the WTO to extend its scope. He argues that by the 
incorporation of the latter agreement, the WTO exposed that new issues could be 
brought into the WTO which fall outside the traditional non-discrimination regime 
and encroach on the realm of domestic regulation
273
. However the author counters 
that in stark contrast with the TRIPS agreement, the EU and the US as being the 
great powers could not reach a consensus regarding the content and institutional form 
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of such a competition agreement
274
. Seemingly, the great powers did not put any 
pressure on the developing countries as opposed to what happened with the TRIPS 
negotiations. At the latter negotiations the great powers had suppressed the 
developing countries by make the threat of possible withdrawal of trade obligations 
vis à vis certain developing countries
275
.   
 
Since Europe’s views of competition law have shifted towards an alignment with the 
US, would they nowadays be able to make an agreement
276
? Whatever the answer to 
this question, the WTO still provides a suitable framework for linking. For instance, 
should the developing countries agree to open up market access through the adopting 
of this model, a partial disarmament of the anti-dumping actions by the developed 




2.2. Special and different treatment: Public policy mechanism 
 
78. With reference to the chapter on impediment, it is often argued that an 
international obligation to adopt an international competition law complying with 





This concern derives from the inequality on an economic and competition law of 
scale between the developed countries and the developing countries. It stems from 
the differing needs of these countries and different dimensions of development. The 
WTO secretariat recognized the view that there is a need for exemptions due to the 
diversity of the members
279
. Consequently, a preferential regime with exemptions for 
developing countries, comparable to the TRIPS agreement, would be a dynamic and 
feasible solution. A ‘policy space’ could be recognized within the framework for 
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developing countries in order to pursue economic and social policies for 
development
280
. This is one of the essential requirements to bring the developing 




79. An example would be a provision used in the TRIPS agreement which granted 
the developing countries the exception of enforcing their intellectual property rights 
within a certain transition period
282
. In particular for a competition agreement, when 
a developing economy is for instance in the transition from an infant economy 
towards a market economy, there may be a genuine need for cooperation among 
firms, especially where infrastructure is inadequate. Therefore a rule of reason might 
be executed allowing this cartel and justifying the transaction for these 
circumstances. In this way the developing country would be given the chance to 
prevent efficient firms of being penalized by bigger markets. Conversely it gives 





3. Elements of the multilateral competition agreement 
 
80. The minimum level suggested by the doctrine entails minimum requirements of 
domestic competition law to overcome international problems which are exposed by 
the failure to resolve on a domestic competition level
284
. Essentially this will also 
imply the need to erase protectionist measures hindering free trade. The elements 





Firstly there is the clarification and implementation of the core principles of the 
WTO, namely, procedural fairness, non-discrimination and transparency
286
. The 
second area of the agreement would include the ban of hard core cartels, and the last 
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area of negotiation would include the special needs of developing countries by 





Correspondingly a general consensus could be found in the doctrine that the WTO 
would be capable of adopting a set of undertakings on competition policy 
incorporating these ‘core principles’. Janow argued that this incorporation involves a 




These core principles are the cornerstone of the WTO and already embedded in the 
majority of the WTO agreements. They are partly designed to establish and maintain 





81. This principle has been entrenched in the WTO agreements since its adoption
289
 
and was considered as one of the core rules. From its inception in Article X of GATT 




82. In essence for competition law, it would include the obligation that the 
administration of competition policies must be based on published laws, regulations 
and guidelines
291
.  This provision could possibly also include that enforcement 
decisions should be published, depending on whether information is confidential or 
not. 
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3.2. Non-discrimination provision 
 
83. The next fundamental provision of the WTO entails the principle of national 
treatment and most-favoured-nation components. The multilateral agreement would 





The principle of national treatment, regarded as one of the foundations of the 
WTO
294
, is meant to maintain a competitive equality between products of one 
member state and those of other member states
295
. Clearly the application of the 
principle will vary depending on if it is applied to trade in goods, trade in services or 
intellectual property. In particular, Article III. 4 of the GATT 1994 is of special 
interest for this dissertation. This article requires national treatment with respect to 
all laws, regulations and requirement affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, 




However, the scope of Article III.4 of the GATT 1994 has already been interpreted 
broadly in order to include any laws and regulations which might adversely modify 





84. In particular for the minimum agreement, the implementation of a non-
discrimination provision would entail the efforts of states to internalize benefits 
while externalizing costs, namely preventing the use of export cartel exemptions and 




Concerning the developing countries, some argue that strengthening the non-
discriminatory principle would constitute a more effective means of reducing 
governmental distortions which would promote the non-discriminatory 
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. Nonetheless this would imply an obligation for developing countries 
to open up their markets to foreign direct investment
300
. Therefore, in the potential 
situation of an international agreement, developing countries want the potential 







85. A part of the doctrine believes the WTO to be the best suited institution to 
address issues with distributional consequences as there are potential parties winning 
and other losing regarding the competition negotiations
302
. This belief originates 
from the TRIPS agreement that would never have been conceded by the developing 
countries in a stand-alone agreement
303
. This part of the doctrine is therefore 
convinced that the competition negotiations should be kept within the WTO since the 




4.2. Minimum rules with public policy defense 
 
87. The following arguments are provided by the advocates of a competition 
agreement within the WTO arising out of certain minimum rules but with a 
preferential regime for developing countries. 
 
88. Concerning the minimum rules, the advocates view the dispute settlement 
procedures of the WTO as being beneficial for the harmonization and convergence of 
the competition rules through the adoption of these minimum rules. Agreeing to such 
a multilateral instrument makes the dispute settlement procedure available for 
countries to enforce obligations of member states. This is vital not only for the 
developed countries but also for the developing countries since this gives the 
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competition commitments more credibility. It is viable to ensure that the developing 
countries enforce their commitments but also viable for those developing countries to 
execute their commitments in exchange for their concessions/exemptions
305
. As a 
result, regardless of their preferences, this system provides a specific minimum level 
of competition law. 
 
89. Concerning the preferential mechanism for developing countries, it may be in the 
interest of developing countries to approve such an agreement in exchange for 
greater technical assistance and international enforcement cooperation
306
. 
Subsequently this would involve the opening of their markets to foreign investors. 
Additionally, this agreement is capable of reducing international anticompetitive 
behaviour where the developing countries’ enterprises could eve tually benefit from 
the prohibition of the international merger cartels between multinational firms. 
However the existing questions will always remain: Will the multinational firms now 
drive the local firms out of their market? Will the infant industries resist the 
international market pressure? Will the developing countries lose out in the global 
welfare standard reached by an international competition agreement? Therefore, the 
adoption of a dynamic preferential regime existing out of a public policy mechanism 
for developing countries is the necessary tool of persuasion in order to accept the 






90. Nonetheless there is disagreement among authors whether conclusions can be 
drawn from the TRIPS agreement and projected on the competition related 
negotiations. 
 
91. Firstly, the argument is raised that the competition law dispute is not negotiated 
in a comparable environment to the Intellectual Property negotiations. These legal 
commentators are of the opinion that unlike the TRIPS agreement which was crafted 
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around provisions incorporated from pre-existing intellectual property agreements 





Sweeney shares the same opinion and expresses several concerns around the 
dissimilar background of the TRIPS agreement and competition negotiations
308
. 
Alongside his arguments about the disagreement between the US and the EU, the 
author mentions the lack of interest of large business and lobby groups which had a 




92. Secondly, since the outcome of a potential competition agreement is unsure, 
parties are not willing to pay a high cost. Bradford observed that relating to the 
TRIPS agreement, a clear distinction could be drawn between the countries 
benefiting (developed countries) and countries losing from making this agreement
310
. 
For this reason, a trade-off could be made within the WTO with other trade-related 
aspects such as concessions to lower tariffs on textiles, clothing and agriculture. 
However when states cannot predict which general policy will ultimately be the most 
favourable, they are less likely to support any all-embracing policy proposal
311
. 
Consequently while the costs are high and the benefits of a global competition policy 
uncertain, the developed countries and in particular the US were not prepared to 
accept any transfer payment that would address the distributional effects. Sweeney 
therefore observed that the US was not prepared to show any intention of abandoning 




93. Thirdly, there is the significant role that TRIPS played in engendering distrust of 
competition law since many of the promised trade-offs to the developing countries 
failed to eventuate, or seemingly neutral provisions were used in a way advantageous 
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to the developing countries
313
. For this reason, it is doubtful if developing countries 
will again accept such a trade-off, since they are disillusioned by the manner in 
which developed countries sought to enforce the TRIPS provisions on them. 
Bradford and Sweeney are of the opinion that implementation in the sphere of 
intellectual property rights cultivated the wrong impression or even optimism that 





5.2. Minimum rules with public policy defence 
 
94. However disagreement also exists as to whether such a preferential treatment 
would be ultimately beneficial for developing countries. 
 
Janow for instance is not convinced of the rationale of such a preferential treatment 
for developing countries. He argues that, after all, the main beneficiaries of their 
competition laws are likely to be their own domestic firms and consumers. The 
exemption for a country to apply its legal competition framework in a transparent 
and non-discriminatory way for a certain period of time is not likely to benefit this 
state. In addition, the core principles of the GATT under the national treatment 
obligation already ensure the obligation for member countries to have a domestic 
competition law in a transparent and non-discriminatory fashion
315
. As noted earlier, 
a nation would in any event be likely to be held accountable under the national 
treatment obligation of the GATT as it currently stands for transparent and non 




Furthermore Noonan notes that none of the arguments demonstrate why measures 
against abuses such as cartelization and monopolization are anti-developmental
317
. In 
his opinion, the adoption of a competition law will likely be harmful to the economy 
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if certain industries and sectors may be exempt from a competition law
318
. Even 
more, they may be able to attract more investors when they for instance do not 
explicitly proscribe vertical restraints.  
 
C. Model III: The ICN  
 
95. After the competition talks stalled within the WTO framework, states sought to 
overcome the negative externalities of decentralized antitrust enforcement through 





So far, bilateral agreements existing out of competition cooperation arrangements on 
a case by case approach between two states have been the major competition 
cooperation on an international level
320
. Each jurisdiction has their own set of 
bilateral agreements being a useful instrument for nurturing dialogue and cooperation 
and the management of competition conflicts
321
. Nevertheless, by using a bilateral 
agreement, convergence of competition law on a global level cannot be reached. 
Furthermore, some developing countries still do not provide a coherent competition 
law and as a consequence these bilateral agreements marginalize the latter
322
. 
Additionally developing countries will not enter into disharmonized bilateral 
agreements with developed countries.  
 
Focussing on soft law issued by international institutions, we can examine three 
international institutions namely UNCTAD, the OECD and the ICN
323
. However the 
ICN is seen as the most comprehensive institution of these and therefore this 
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dissertation will only discuss the ICN
324
. The ICN has been seen as the major 








96. The concept of a global competition initiative gained life in 2000 under the lead 





. It was his belief that, regardless of the WTO undertakings, a move 
towards a global competition initiative was inevitable
328
. The lack of an institution 
which facilitated a forum where parties could share their competition ideas and 
experience, close cooperation and exploration of common issues that could lead to 
convergence led to the institutionalisation of the ICN
329
. Eventually the ICN was 
formed in 2001 under the initiative of the US which reflects their preference for 
avoiding any form of international agreement or voluntary multilateral 
cooperation
330
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2. Functions of the ICN 
 
97. The main goal is to share and disseminate ideas and practices in order to collect 
and produce a view of best practices and improve the enforcement of domestic based 
rules. As opposed to the WTO which performs from a vertical level, the ICN is 
considered to be working on a horizontal level between all the different competition 
authorities. Accordingly, the main focus is not on enhancing a global competition 
agreement but rather on gathering information and capacity building between the 
latter authorities in an informal manner
332
. So the ICN will not be a rule making body 





The body of the vehicle exists out of domestic competition authorities but also 




The major source of information gathering derives from the various Working Groups 
institutionalised within the ICN.  The latter groups gather information and produce 
best recommended practices which are presented during an annual conference shared 
with the overall membership
335
. The ICN thus gathers information concerning 
substantive aspects of national legislation, and initiates projects to promote or 
facilitate convergence on substantive, procedural and administrative aspects of 
competition law
336
. Practically, the ICN will firstly gather information through 
decentralized experimentation by testing different substantial rules of several 
jurisdictions. Secondly they will build consensus on a superior practice while they 
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Best practice recommendations are for instance produced for multijurisdictional 
mergers including the review of multijurisdictional mergers, an analytical framework 
for merger review and investigating techniques to make the process less cost 
associated
338
. Besides these activities, they inform new authorities on technical 




 3. Pro 
 
3.1. Capacity building 
 
98. One of the major achievements of the ICN is reflected in the possibility for 
capacity building. For example in the case of hard core cartels, i  order to be able to 
globally prosecute these cartels, capacity building is vital especially for the 
developing countries. Through the ICN, member competition authorities can share 





3.2. Democratic working 
 
99. The inclusion of the domestic competition authorities from the developed and 
from the developing countries, as well as the presence of other interested non-
governmental parties, assigns the ICN a high democratic appeal
341
. Additionally, the 
work is undertaken by the participants themselves and thus not a top-heavy 
secretariat
342
. Furthermore, competition agencies can speak freely without the fear of 
expressing views contradicting other law related issues
343
. Therefore, one of the 
pillars of its success is its inclusiveness and inviting character. 
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This is in contrast with the WTO that arguably suffers from perceptions of capture 
and illegitimacy. Sweeney argues that these may be less of an issue for the ICN since 




3.3. No commitments – Informal gathering 
 
100. The argument is raised that the informal contacts within such an organizations 
will likely lead to greater recognition of the benefits and will lead to new analytical 
methods and analysis of new issues
345
. Even more, it may help to promote the 
adoption of best practices in all countries
346
. There is a significant sense in the 
international community of the added value in this expanded dialogue
347
. As 
mentioned before, since the costs are so high, parties do not tend to take any risks. 
Through the informal cooperation within the ICN, they are offered the chance to 
experiment with different approaches and develop a sense of their economic impact 
without committing themselves to certain obligations such as in the WTO
348
. In 
particular for the developing countries, recommended practices are flexible and 
acknowledge differences for developing countries
349
. In this regard, they appear to be 
similar to the public policy mechanism explained in Model II since there is no real 




101. Other authors disagree with the role of the ICN as being the major facilitator of 
reaching an international competition harmonization agreement. 
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4.1. No linkage  
 
102. First of all, the lack of possibilities within the ICN of linkage or transfer 
payments by making concessions is disputed and it is thus unlikely that the ICN will 
reach convergence
350
. For this reason, Guzman and Sweeney are of the opinion that 
the ICN is an international institution serving the purpose of reducing the cost of 
international cooperation, improving the communication through sharing of non-
confidential information or informal policy changes but is ultimately no substitute for 




Furthermore, it is contended that ICN is a strong forum concerning the 
harmonization function as the institution is lacking a trade related perspective
352
. For 
the reason, arguably there is no push for a global competition regime which is in 




4.2. Undemocratic: legitimacy concerns 
 
103. The democratic status of the ICN is from time to time disputed in the doctrine 




Firstly there might be legitimacy concerns due to the adopting of international 
competition policies by a clique of unelected and foreign authorities
355
. It is the 
belief of Sweeney that consequently bilateral agreements will continue to be made 
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The second argued democratic weakness of this institution is based on the 
prerequisite of a country having dedicated competition legislation for membership
357
. 
Despite the adoption of competition law by the majority of the developing countries, 
there is a fear that the ICN will be dominated by the participation of the developed 
countries instead of the developing countries that are the most in need of capacity 
building requirements
358
. Further, although the ICN is presumably a virtual 
organization in which 90% of the work is done through email and 
teleconferencing
359
, it is arguable if developing countries have the financial 
capacities to attend the working groups and the annual conferences
360
. Accordingly 





4.3. No commitments – No dispute settlement mechanism 
 
104. Sceptics of the ICN contend that the commitments are generalised and not 
accompanied by the obligation of implementing them in a domestic competition law. 
In their opinion noted in 2002, the recommendations made so far are already implied 
by the WTO core principles of non-discrimination embedded in Article III.4 of the 
GATT and thus the principles lack the enforceability and robustness of the WTO 
standards
362
. Yet the author recognises this is not the main goal of the ICN and rather 
is established from the point of developing perspectives and practices in order to 




Further it is submitted that the ICN, unlike the WTO, is unlikely to be an effective 
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105. The success of the ICN has proven these authors wrong
365
 yet some concerns 
are still expressed regarding the commitments of the members. Regardless of the 
adopting of superior practices by the domestic competition authorities, achieving 
broad agreement upon recommended practices, by itself, does not ensure that such 
standards become embedded in the practice of individual jurisdictions.  
 
In the goal of reaching convergence through the recommended practices, the 
adopting of superior practices by domestic competition authorities will not succeed 
by itself if there is no authority ensuring the implementing of these standards in the 
individual jurisdictions
366
. Unless there is monitoring and continuous coaching, 





Nonetheless, the ICN as an informal venue with no ground location and no binding 
rulemaking power has turned out to be an enormous success
368
. It has assisted in 
reaching consensus and convergence in different fields
369
 and aided newer 
competition agencies in giving them an anchor point
370
. As a result, the ICN cannot 
be overlooked anymore in the search for convergence and thus Model IV approaches 
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D. Model IV:  Cooperation between the WTO and the ICN 
 
106. The last model can be elucidated briefly, but it brings together all the elements 
of the previous described models in one most plausible model. 
 
According to Janow, the WTO and the ICN could hardly be more dissimilar
371
. He 
observes that besides the fact both include developing and developed countries, 
points of commonality are few. However, this could perhaps be used in an 
advantageous way as both institutions are not overlapping. Moreover, the ICN is not 
an entirely sufficient forum to reach coherent convergence and was also never meant 
to be
372
. In this sense, the ICN could pave the road towards a greater international 
convergence accomplished by a rulemaking body such as the WTO. Hence a 
complementary set of competition provisions could be developed by both institutions 
and the ICN could investigate and gather information to reach a consensus while the 









1. WTO private market access restraints – ICN supplementary competition principles 
 
107. Fox favoured in 1999 the approach of purely addressing the private market 
access restraints within the WTO, while the other competition-related issues should 
be treated in another independent international forum since the WTO primarily 
focusses on trade related issues
375
. According to the author, competition laws 
designed to weaken private restraints play the same basic role as liberal trade law and 
should be placed within the WTO
376
. Competition rules not addressing market access 
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should therefore be left out of the WTO. At this time, the author did not predict the 
success of the ICN but since its current success the ICN could be possibly appointed 
as ‘another independent international forum’. This solution accords with Model I 
where competition-trade related provisions are adopted within existing WTO 
agreements and non-trade related competition issues would be dealt within the ICN. 
 
2. ICN consensus reaching - WTO binding rulemaking 
 
108. Whilst the ICN is a soft law forum with a consultative and deliberative reach to 
find a consensus on global competition law, the WTO is forum for the negotiation of 
hard binding rules which includes obligations for its members. A proposed scenario 
is one in which the ICN deliberately, being a channel of building mutual trust and 
consultation, searches for consensus on soft law provisions which could be evolved 
into hard law provisions through including them in the existing WTO agreements
377
 
of model I and subsequently handing over the role of guardian to the WTO. 
Alternatively the ICN could gather information and reach consensus on the minimum 
competition requirements such as the core principles and the ban on hard core 
cartels
378
 which would eventually be institutionalized in an agreement like model II 
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The convergence of competition law up to the Doha Round 
 
109. From the start of the dissertation, it has been apparent that international trade 
law (WTO) and a competition policy would be complementary elements to move 
towards trade liberalization, deregulation and globalization. However the Kodak/Fuji 
case provided the evidence of the shortcomings of the WTO by indicating sharply 
that public restraints and private restraints are dealt with in separate boxes. Private 
restraints have been completely forgotten in the past within the WTO and are only 
regulated in domestic competition laws.  
 
110. Nonetheless a common competition consensus could not be reached amongst 
the WTO members in 2004 resulting in its removal from the Doha agenda. I have 
attempted to indicate the precise impediments hindering the realization of an 
international competition policy within the WTO. Every jurisdiction reflects and 
represents its own unique social and legal vision. The approval of an international 
common set of substantive competition principles would imply to a certain extent the 
standardisation of the domestic policies, thereby depriving developing countries in 
particular of many of their important policy tools. For that reason I concluded that 
support and competition cooperation is highly needed for developing countries but 
the acceptance of a static common international competition policy is not feasible to 
support their needs. In general and specifically with regard to developing countries: 
one size does not fit all.  
 
The convergence of competition law, a decade after the stalled negotiations of 
the Doha Round 
 
111. Having observed the hindering factors, the critical question should be asked 
what the future role of the WTO in the convergence process still entails. I therefore 
developed four different models in the second part of the dissertation designed to 
overcome these impediments. It became apparent that the WTO perceived to have 












provisions incorporated in the Telecommunications Reference Paper which was 
successfully used in the Telmex case. However I observed the undeniable success of 
the ICN due to its unique informal structure. The question arises, since ICN’s issued 
soft law becomes hard law when implemented by members in their legislation, 
whether or not the ICN has irreversibly taken over the leading role in the 
convergence process?  
 
I, as the author, am aware of the many complications facing these models. However, 
after a decade of the successes of the ICN and the stalled negotiations within the 
WTO, in my opinion a new structure should be considered in the attempt to reach a 
convergence of competition law. The success of the ICN could be used in a 
beneficial way since the ICN and the WTO are complementary organizations. The 
ICN and the WTO could work in perfect harmony bringing global competition law to 
the next level.  
 
Because of the recommended practices of the ICN and its informal style of working, 
the suspicions of developing countries that competition law is simply another tool 
used by the developed countries to achieve their own goals is dissipating. Confidence 
is growing that opting into multilateral organizations will promote economic 
development. In addition to this, next to the ICN, there is still a belief in the doctrine 
that negotiations within the WTO with regard to the adoption of a competition policy 
may resurface. The WTO, being the only binding rulemaking body, is still regarded 
as the most appropriate forum to add a global competition policy since international 
trade and competition law are based on the same sympathetic values. 
 
112. For precisely this reason, model IV turns out to be the most applicable and 
realistic model. Thus by means of the consensus-reaching process within the ICN, 
countries are delicately introduced to the competition principles. Subsequently these 
principles will be converted into hard law through the WTO such as suggested in 
Model I or through Model II existing out of minimum rules with a special different 
treatment for developing countries. With the following model, many posed 
impediments such as the observed sovereignty, one static standard and lack of 
infrastructure concerns are obviated. Therefore I am thoroughly of the belief that 












advantageous to all countries. Even if the implemented soft law became by this time 
hard law, the incorporation of these principles in the WTO could serve as a metric 
towards enriching its role as an institution. 
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